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LANDS AND NATURAL RESOURCES
OVERVIEW
Few cases were decided by the Tenth Circuit in the natural resources
and lands area; all nine cases selected for publication are presented in this
section. The areas of litigation in the 1978-79 term included mining law,
water pollution, public lands, and Indian lands.
I. MINING
The two cases in the mining law area arose out of the efforts of the
federal government to invalidate existing mining claims. Both opinions fo-
cused primarily on the question of whether the claims contained "valuable
mineral deposits," 1 an element which must be shown if the locator of the
claim is to receive a patent under the federal mining laws. Although the two
opinions touched upon many of the same issues such as "value" and "mar-
ketability," the facts and the legislative histories regarding the type of min-
eral controlled.
A. Shell Oil Co. v. Andrus
2
Plaintiffs Shell Oil and D.A. Shale, Inc., owners of unpatented oil shale
mining claims, were applying for patents on the claims. To qualify for pat-
ents, the plaintiffs had to prove the claims contained a "valuable mineral
deposit." The Tenth Circuit cited the rule established by the Supreme
Court in Cole v. Ralph3 that the locator of an unpatented mining claim has a
vested property interest if the claim is properly located. The primary issue
was whether present or pre-1920 Interior Department standards were to be
used to determine what constitutes a "valuable mineral deposit." The court
held that the Interior Department could not apply present standards to
claims located prior to 1920 which would therefore retroactively invalidate
the mining claims. 4 Because the oil shale deposits constituted a "valuable
mineral deposit" prior to 1920 when the claims were staked, the Tenth Cir-
cuit held that Shell Oil and D.A. Shale, Inc. had a vested property interest.
The court stated that a ruling by the Interior Department could not depart
from the old standards and apply present standards; such a ruling would be
beyond executive authority. 5
The Shell Oil case might have an impact on future mining litigation in
regard to retroactive application of department rulings. However, one lower
court recently has construed narrowly Shell Oil by limiting the case to the
facts, ze., that departmental rulings and congressional actions have treated
I. See 30 U.S.C. §§ 22, 29, 35 (1976). See Vlautin, To Lease or To Locate, 19 ROCKY MTN.
MIN. L. INsT. 393 (1974).
2. 591 F.2d 597 (10th Cir. 1979), appeal docketed, No. 78-1815 (June 4, 1979).
3. 252 U.S. 286 (1920).
4. 591 F.2d 597 (10th Cir. 1979), appeal docketed, No. 78-1815 (June 4, 1979).
5. 591 F.2d at 603-04.
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oil shale in a manner different from other minerals. 6
The litigation commenced in September 1964 when the Secretary of the
Interior asserted that certain oil shale placer mining claims which had pat-
ent applications pending were invalid. The Secretary of the Interior argued
that the claims contained no valuable mineral deposits either at the present
time or prior to 1920 when the claims were located. Five months of hearings
were held in front of an administrative law judge who determined that the
oil shale claims owned by Shell Oil and D.A. Shale, Inc. were valid and that
the patents should issue. 7 The Interior Board of Land Appeals reversed the
decision of the administrative law judge thereby upholding the government's
claims.8 Shell Oil and D.A. Shale, Inc., as plaintiffs, filed a petition in the
federal district court requesting a review of the Secretary's order cancelling
the disputed claims. After the district court determined the claims were
valid,9 this appeal came before the Tenth Circuit.
To prove the "valuable" element under federal mining laws, the locator
must show that the mineral deposit meets either the "marketability" test
whereby the mineral can be "extracted, removed and marketed at a
profit,"' 1 or the closely related "prudent man" test whereby the mineral is of
such quantity and quality that a prudent man would continue mining the
mineral." However, oil shale deposits did not meet either the "marketabil-
ity" or the less onerous "prudent man" test prior to 1920. The Tenth Circuit
stated that oil shale deposits would have to have been considered "valuable"
prior to 1920 under other standards such as then existing Interior Depart-
ment actions, practices, instructions, or decisions.'
2
By referring to the Department of Interior records from 1915 to the
present, the Tenth Circuit determined that oil shale deposits had been desig-
nated as "valuable" by the Interior Department and by Congress even
though no market existed at the time the claim was located and even though
a prudent man would not have mined the mineral at that time. For exam-
ple, the portion of the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 which placed oil shale
under a leasing system instead of the previous location system specifically
stated that the validity of pre-1920 oil shale placer claims was not to be
6. In a later coal mining case with similar facts, the federal district court rejected plain-
tiff's contention that Shell Oil stood for the proposition that "an administrative agency . . .
cannot retroactively apply a rule that represents a complete departure from a long-standing
administrative practice." The court based its conclusion first, on the fact that special congres-
sional approval was given to the Interior Department's handling of oil shale claim location in
Shell and secondly, on the fact that the mining claims in Shell had been located 50 years previ-
ously. Utah Int'l, Inc. v. Andrus, No. 77-0225 (D. Utah June 15, 1979).
7. 591 F.2d at 598.
8. Id The court cited the decision of the Interior Board of Land Appeals at 16 IBLA 112
(1974).
9, 426 F. Supp. 894 (D. Colo. 1977), afd, 591 F.2d 597 (10th Cir. 1979), appeal docketed,
No. 78-1815 (June 4, 1979).
10. United States v. Coleman, 390 U.S. 599, 600 (1968). Note that this Court-determined
standard though valid, does not apply to coal and other specified minerals since 1976 because
regulations requiring lease applicants to meet a "present marketability" standard have been
codified at 43 C.F.R. § 3520.1-1(c) (1978).
11. See note 30 infra and accompanying text.
12. 591 F.2d at 599.
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impaired.' 3 And the Interior Department, following the congressional man-
date, patented other pre-1920 oil shale claims after the Mineral Leasing Act
of 1920 became effective.' 4 Also, a 1927 departmental decision held that oil
shale deposits could be designated "valuable mineral deposits" based on the
fact that oil shale would in the future constitute a very valuable resource and
therefore an immediately profitable market was unnecessary.' 5
In addition to the departmental actions, congressional actions affirmed
that oil shale deposits were to be considered valuable. A congressional inves-
tigation in the early 1930's motivated after a General Land Office official
attacked departmental guidelines for issuances of oil shale patents focused
specifically on these guidelines. Congress made no changes to the "valuable
mineral deposit" requirement as a result of the hearings even though Con-
gress has the authority to alter departmental standards. 16 In addition to its
reliance upon the foregoing history, the Tenth Circuit also relied on their
opinion in Brennan v. Udall. 17
The Tenth Circuit concluded that lands containing oil shale deposits
were "valuable mineral deposits" and could be validly located prior to the
Mineral Leasing Act of 1920.18 Therefore, because there were unpatented
mining claims which had been properly located, the Tenth Circuit relied on
the Supreme Court ruling of Cole v. Ralph '9 to hold that Shell Oil and D.A.
Shale, Inc. had a vested proeprty right in the oil shale placer mining claims.
The Tenth Circuit also noted that a mere change in the philosophy of a
department was not enough to invalidate the claims. 20 The original rules,
instructions, and interpretations of the Interior Department that oil shale
was valuable had been given "contemporaneous construction" in 1920 by
the Interior Department. These departmental standards further had the
"express and implied acquiescence" of Congress and no later reenactment of
administrative rules was made by Congress after its investigation. Rather,
the silence of Congress evidenced an affirmative adoption of the depart-
ment's interpretation of the then existing requirements needed to obtain a
patent. 2 1 The later policy changes by the department which no longer re-
gard oil shale claims as a "valuable mineral deposit" were due to a change in
the philosophy of department personnel only.22 By trying to apply new
standards retroactively, the Tenth Circuit stated that "the changes here
sought to be made by the Department as to 1920 standards incorporated in
13. 30 U.S.C. § 193 (1976) (amended 1978) states that lands valuable for certain minerals,
including coal and oil shale, are subject to disposition under the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920
"except as to valid claims existent on February 25, 1920."
14. 591 F.2d at 599-601.
15. 591 F.2d at 599 (citing Freeman v. Summers, 52 L.D. 201 (1927)).
16. 591 F.2d at 601-02.
17. 379 F.2d 803 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 975 (1967) (Tenth Circuit held that the
Interior Department for over 50 years has classified lands containing oil shale deposits as a
"valuable source").
18. 591 F.2d at 599.
19. 252 U.S. 286 (1920) (title dispute over mining claims on which patents were to issue).
20. 591 F.2d at 603.
21. Id at 603-05.
22. Id at 603.
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the mining laws are well beyond executive authority."'23 The oil shale min-
ing claims were therefore held valid based upon the pre-1920 designation of
oil shale as a valuable mineral deposit.
B. Hallenbeck v. Kleppe
24
In Hallenbeck, the Tenth Circuit again discussed the "valuable mineral
deposit" requirement of the federal mining laws.25 Because this case in-
volved sand, gravel, and gold rather than oil shale, which had been given
special treatment in the Shell Oil case, the Tenth Circuit based its holding on
the "prudent man" and "marketability" tests often used by courts in deter-
mining a "valuable mineral deposit."
The Department of the Interior initiated the litigation by contesting
patent applications on seven placer claims located by plaintiffs prior to 1955
in Lake County, Colorado. An administrative law judge declared the claims
invalid because the claims did not contain a "valuable mineral deposit."
The plaintiffs then commenced their suit in federal district court to enjoin
the government from doing any work on the claims and later amended the
district court complaint to challenge the decision of the Interior Board of
Land Appeals which had affirmed the administrative law judge. The dis-
trict court granted summary judgment to the government, stating that the
administrative finding of the invalidity of the claims was supported by sub-
stantial evidence and should therefore be upheld.
2 6
The first issue discussed by the Tenth Circuit on appeal was the plain-
tiffs' argument that the doctrines of laches and estoppel should apply to the
federal government. The Tenth Circuit stated that the general rule is that
the defenses of laches and estoppel are not applicable to the federal govern-
ment in cases regarding public lands. 27 The rule may, at times, be relaxed;
but in this case, there was no showing of the necessary elements to establish a
foundation for laches.
28
The plaintiffs' second contention that there was sufficient evidence to
support their claim of a "valuable mineral discovery" merited the bulk of the
Hallenbeck decision. The Tenth Circuit used both the "prudent man" and
the "marketability" tests because the minerals at issue were both metallic
and nonmetallic.
The court stated that the locator of a rare mineral claim must meet the
"prudent man" test to establish a "valuable mineral deposit." The test is
met when development of the mineral deposit would be pursued by a person
of ordinary prudence.29 The "prudent man" test, usually applied to rare
23. Id at 604.
24. 590 F.2d 852 (10th Cir. 1979).
25. 30 U.S.C. §§ 22, 29, 35 (1976).
26. 590 F.2d at 854-55.
27. United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19 (1947) (determination of state and federal
rights to certain submerged lands off the coast of California).
28. 590 F.2d at 855.
29. Id at 856.
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metallic minerals, is a complement of the well-known "marketability" test, 30
usually applied to minerals of widespread occurrence. After presentation of
conflicting evidence by the parties, the admininstrative board concluded
that no prudent man would presently develop the Hallenbecks' claims for
gold.
As to the nonmetallic minerals of sand and gravel on the placer claims,
the plaintiffs presented evidence showing that such minerals had been sold
from neighboring claims; there was no evidence of sales from the contested
claims. The Tenth Circuit, applying the "marketability" test, held that ac-
cording to the evidence presented, no readily available market existed for
sand and gravel from plaintiffs' claims. 3 ' Further addressing the plaintiffs'
arguments as to the existence of a future market, the court required that
"there be, at the time of dzscoveqy, a market for the discovered material that is
sufficiently profitable to attract the efforts of a person of ordinary prudence
... . [t]he question of marketability is one of fact."
'3 2
The plaintiffs' other arguments 1) that the government failed to carry
its burden of proof, 2) that valuable mineral deposits on adjoining property
were not fully considered, and 3) that the misapplication of the law by the
administrative law judge was prejudicial error necessitating a trial de novo
were also rejected by the Tenth Circuit. The administrative and district




Two cases interpreting specific provisions of the Federal Water Pollu-
tion Control Act 34 were decided by the Tenth Circuit. The first case in-
volved reporting requirements of the Act and the second case discussed the
definitions of point and nonpoint sources.
A. Ward v. Coleman
35
Under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA), notification
must be made to the appropriate federal agency of any discharges of oil or
other hazardous substances into the navigable waters of the United States.
36
Ward, operator of a drilling site from which oil had overflowed into a creek,
contended that these self-reporting requirements violated his fifth amend-
ment rights because information from the report was later used in assessing
civil fines.37 The Tenth Circuit, adhering to the doctrine that privileges
under the self-incrimination clause of the fifth amendment should be liber-
30. United States v. Coleman, 390 U.S. 599, 600 (1968) (patent on federal lands was de-
nied based on theory that quartzite was not a "valuable mineral deposit").
31. 590 F.2d at 856-58.
32. Id at 859 (emphasis added).
33. Id at 858-60.
34. 33 U.S.C. § 1251-1376 (1976) (amended 1978).
35. 598 F.2d 1187 (10th Cir. 1979).
36. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1321(b)(3), (5), (6) (1976) (amended 1978) regarding Congressional
declaration of policy against discharges of oil or hazardous substances.
37. 598 F.2d at 1190.
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ally construed, agreed with Ward.38 However, the court did not go so far as
to invalidate the self-reporting requirements or the civil penalties sections of
the FWPCA, stating that "it is permissible to assess civil penalties . . . pro-
vided that the evidence used to establish the discharge is derived from a
source wholly independent of the compelled disclosure ....
The litigation commenced when Ward, after discovery and immediate
clean up of the oil overflow, submitted his statutorily required report to the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). The EPA notified the Coast
Guard because the spill involved navigable waters and the Coast Guard sub-
sequently assessed a civil penalty against Ward. After refusing to pay the
fine, Ward filed suit in the federal district court and moved to convene a
three-judge court. The federal government also filed suit to collect for the
penalty. The two cases were consolidated. ° Ward's motion for summary
judgment and request for a three-judge court were denied. In a subsequent
trial, the jury upheld the fine and found for the federal government.
4 1
The Tenth Circuit first addressed the issue of the three-judge court.
Under now repealed 28 U.S.C. § 2282, a three-judge court had to be con-
vened where certain types of injunctions which could have the effect of para-
lyzing an entire regulatory scheme were requested. 42 However in Ward, the
Tenth Circuit determined that the validity of portions of the FWPCA itself,
and not the regulatory scheme, was under scrutiny. Therefore, the trial
court's decision to refuse convening a three-judge court was affirmed.
43
The next issue addressed was whether the civil penalties contained in
the FWPCA were, in reality, criminal penalties. If this question was deter-
mined affirmatively, then the self-reporting requirements under the FWPCA
could be drawn into question. 4 Analysis of this criminal/civil issue was bro-
ken into three parts: 1) whether congressional intent could be found in the
statutory language, 2) what scheme was used to enforce the statute, and 3)
whether congressional intent could be ascertained based on indicators enu-
merated earlier by the Court in Kenned, v. Medoza-Marlttez.
45
The Tenth Circuit looked first at the statutory language which directs
the Coast Guard to automatically assess a civil penalty of up to $5,000 per
offense. Factors considered to determine the amount of penalty to assess in-
cluded the size of business, the ability of the business to continue, and the
seriousness of the violation.46 Even though the collected monies went into a
fund for regulating and remedying later oil spills, the Tenth Circuit held the
38. Id at 1194.
39. Id
40. Id at 1188-89.
41. Ward v. Coleman, 423 F. Supp. 1352 (W.D. Okla. 1976), rev'd and remanded, 598 F.2d
1187 (10th Cir. 1979).
42. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963) (the seven tests were used to de-
termine whether sanction of losing citizenship for leaving country during wartime was penal or
regulatory in nature).
43. 598 F.2d at 1189-90.
44. Id at 1190.
45. 372 U.S. 144 (1963).
46. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(6) (1976) (amended 1978).
[Vol. 57:2
LANDS AND NA TURAL RESOURCES
penalty to be "based on a retributive and punitive motivation," 4 7 .e., seri-
ousness of the violation.
Turning to the administrative enforcement scheme, the court again dis-
cussed the considerations used in determining the amount of penalty assessed
but looked at the federal regulations and Coast Guard policy instead of at
the statutory language. Again, the Tenth Circuit found the penalty based
on "punitive considerations.
'48
In conclusively determining that the penalty was criminal rather than
civil in nature, the court next applied the traditional tests set out by the
Supreme Court in Kennedy to the fact pattern.49 The tests to which the court
gave considerable weight in deciding that the penalty was of a criminal na-
ture were 1) whether the statute furthered an aim of punishment-retribution
and 2) whether, because of the strict liability of the statute, the behavior
regulated under the statute is already a crime. Both questions were decided
affirmatively.
Based on this three-part analysis of the criminal/civil issue, the Tenth
Circuit held that the notice which Ward was statutorily required to file
could not be used to determine either liability or the amount of the civil
penalty. However, the self-reporting requirements and civil penalty portions
of the FWPCA were not set aside because civil penalties could still be as-
sessed from evidence completely independent of the necessary report. The
case was reversed and remanded to determine the question of independent
evidence.
50
B. United States v. Earth Sciences, Inc.5 1
In Earth Sciences, the Tenth Circuit ruled that certain activities such as
mining could include point as well as nonpoint sources even though the stat-
ute seemingly defined mining activities as nonpoint sources. Therefore, the
FWPCA could control these activities because it is designed to regulate pol-
lution emitted from an identifiable point source. The United States filed
this action alleging three violations of the FWPCA after a toxic substance
used by Earth Sciences in its gold leaching operations was discharged into a
nearby creek after an early thaw had caused both the primary and the re-
serve sump pumps to fill to capacity. The Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) first referred the matter to the Colorado Department of Health but
later the EPA filed a notice of violations of 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (a) 52 under the
FWPCA identifying an open ditch between the pumps and the creek as a
point source. 53 Earth Sciences complied with the resulting EPA order by
47. 598 F.2d at 1191.
48. Id at 1192.
49. Id at 1193.
50. Id at 1194-95.
51. 599 F.2d 368 (10th Cir. 1979). See generally Miskovsky & Van Hook, Regulation of Forestry
Related Nonpoint Source Pollution Under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 9
NAT. RESOURCEs LAw. 645 (1976).
52. 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (a) (1976) whereby "the discharge of any pollutant is unlawful."
53. A point source is defined as "[alny discernible, confined and discrete conveyance, in-
cluding but not limited to any pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit, well, discrete fissure,
container, rolling stock, concentrated animal feeding operation, or vessel or other floating craft,
19801
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constructing a larger reserve sump pump and by assuring the EPA that it
would monitor any seepage around the pumps. Thereafter, the United
States filed suit in the federal district court.
54
The issue which concerned the district court was whether the hazardous
substance was discharged through a point source as opposed to a nonpoint
source as defined under the FWPCA, because the Act only regulates hazard-
ous substances discharged from a point source. Earth Sciences contended
the discharge was from a nonpoint source for which a regulatory scheme has
not yet been developed. The district court had interpreted a federal guide-
line requesting the EPA to develop a regulatory scheme for nonpoint sources
such as mining activities as creating an exemption.5 5 The district court
therefore decided that pollutants from mining activites are always discharges
from nonpoint sources and dismissed the action.
56
On appeal, the federal government successfully argued that discharges
from mining activities could be conveyed through a point source even
though the discharges may initially be from a nonpoint source. Therefore,
based upon this reasoning, mining activities were capable of regulation
under the FWPCA.
The Tenth Circuit looked to the legislative history of the FWPCA in
determining that Congress meant to classify nonpoint sources as polluting
runoffs caused by rainfall which were difficult to isolate to any one pol-
luter.57 And further, because the purpose of the FWPCA was to protect
navigable waters as fully as possible, the congressional intent was to broadly
define a point source.
58
The opinion briefly discussed Earth Sciences' other arguments. First,
even though the government never adequately pinned down the point
source-variously referring to the sump pump, a well, or a container-the
Tenth Circuit had no trouble finding that the entire leaching system consti-
tuted a point source. Secondly, the court held that the stream need not be
navigable to be controlled by the FWPCA; rather, the body of water into
which a pollutant is discharged must only somehow affect interstate com-
merce. The Tenth Circuit then ruled that civil suits and administrative ac-




Three cases were decided by the Tenth Circuit regarding public lands.
Dissimilar issues were considered in the three cases: quiet title actions
from which pollutants are or may be discharged." 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (1976) (amended
1977).
54. 599 F.2d at 371.
55. 33 U.S.C. § 1314() (1976) as amnded by Pub. L. No. 95-217. The administrator of the
EPA is to issue guidelines for identifying and controlling pollution from mining activities and
other activities such as agriculture and construction.
56. 599 F.2d at 371.
57. Id at 372.
58. d at 371-73.
59. Id at 374-76.
[Vol. 57:2
LANDS AND NA TURAL RESOURCES
against the federal government as to a public road, value of sand and gravel
deposits in a condemnation action by the United States, and the constitu-
tionality of the Antiquities Act.
.4. Kinscherff v. United States° °
In a brief opinion, the Tenth Circuit held that plaintiffs bringing quiet
title actions against the United States6' must have some type of interest in
the property: a right claimed as a member of the public is not a sufficient
property interest.
62
Plaintiffs Kinscherff and others owned land upon which the federal gov-
ernment had built a road to reach a dam. The government would not allow
plaintiffs to use the road to bring in equipment to develop their own land.
The quiet title action was brought to allow the public to use the road and to
allow use by the property owners under the theory of an implied easement.
The district court dismissed the litigation for failure to state a cause of ac-
tion.
In a short reference to the legislative history, the Tenth Circuit stated
that Congress intended that only a "typical" quiet title action, as defined by
state law, could be pursued. Under New Mexico state substantive law only
plaintiffs with an interest in the title to the property are able to bring quiet
title actions; in this case, the "public" had no property interest. 63 Further,
the state statute governing public roads states that after a road has been
open to the public for one year the right-of-way vests in the state. 64 Suppos-
edly, vesting of title in the state precludes vesting in the general public.
The court next addressed the implied easement issue and remanded the
case because factual determinations had not been made as to the existence
and extent of an implied easement. The Tenth Circuit did state that an
easement is a property interest which can be determined under the federal
quiet title statute.
65
B. United States v. 494.10 Acres of Land
66
The Tenth Circuit determined that the value of sand and gravel under-
lying property condemned by the federal government may be considered in
setting compensation for the land only if demand for the sand and gravel
will come in the near future.
67
In a condemnation proceeding commenced by the United States for
flood control, the administrative agency determined the land's "highest and
best use" was for agriculture. No value was assigned to the underlying sand
60. 586 F.2d 159 (10th Cir. 1978) (per curiam).
61. The federal government has waived its sovereign immunity in quiet title actions under
28 U.S.C. § 2409(a) (1976).
62. 586 F.2d at 160-61.
63. Id at 160.
64. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 67-2-5 (1978).
65. 586 F.2d at 161.
66. 592 F.2d 1130 (10th Cir. 1979).
67. Id at 1132.
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and gravel even though stipulations were made that the land contained sig-
nificant amounts of these materials. The administrative agency had given
considerable weight to the testimony of one witness who stated that no extra
monies would be paid for farmland with deposits of sand and gravel. The
district court affirmed the administrative finding based on the theory that
only clearly erroneous decisions should be overturned.
68
The court stated that the appropriate test for determining fair market
value is the willing buyer/willing seller standard whereby value is estab-
lished by an arm's-length transaction. The value assigned by an agency
must include all elements which a willing buyer and a willing seller would
take into account. One element is the "highest and best use," either existing
presently or in the near future. Because the use of gravel from the property
was speculative, not likely to occur in the near future, the court ruled that
payment based on agricultural categorization accounted for all valuation
factors. Since the disputed fact had been considered and ruled on by the
administrative agency, the evidence was not reweighed. The condemnation
award and district court decision were affirmed.69
C. United States v. Smyer
70
A claim by defendants convicted under the Antiquities Act 7' that the
Act was void for vagueness was denied. The Act protects old ruins and arti-
facts on government property.
The events leading to this litigation began when forest rangers found
freshly dug holes at an archaeological site. The roads leading to the site were
posted with signs warning that the excavation was protected by the Act. A
truck found at the site was inventoried and towed away by the rangers. Arti-
facts were later taken from defendants' homes either without objection or
under a search warrant. Defendants were subsequently found guilty of vio-
lating the Act.
72
On appeal, defendants contended that the terms "ruin" and "object of
antiquity" contained in the statute were vague and uncertain. The Tenth
Circuit disagreed stating that "measured by common understanding and
practice, the challenged language conveys a sufficiently definite warning as
to the proscribed conduct. 7 3 The Act therefore gave someone reasonable
notice that digging up 800-900 year-old artifacts, as defendants did, was ille-
gal. Also, the court ruled that defendants were adequately warned by posted
signs that they were in a national forest, and therefore on government land
where the Act applied. 74 The district court convictions were affirmed.
75
68. Id. at 1131.
69. Id at 1131-33.
70. 596 F.2d 939 (lOth Cir. 1979).
71. 16 U.S.C. § 433 (1976) states that "[any person who shall appropriate, excavate, in-
jure, or destroy any historic or prehistoric ruin or montiment, or any object of antiquity" on
government lands without permission may be fined or imprisoned.
72. 596 F.2d at 940-41.
73. Id. at 941.
74. Id
75. Id at 942-43.
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IV. INDIAN LANDS
Two cases involving Indians and their lands came before the Tenth Cir-
cuit. Both decisions focused on interpretation of federal statutes and delega-
tion of power to either the Indian tribe or to the Bureau of Indian Affairs.
The first concerned liquor licensing on a reservation and the second involved
the award of federal highway contracts to Indian companies.
A. United States v. New Mexico
76
The Tenth Circuit held that Indian nations, through a federal delega-
tion of power, and not the states, were empowered to regulate the sale of
alcoholic beverages on Indian lands.
77
By treaty, the Mescalero Indians of New Mexico are entitled to exercise
sovereign powers within their reservation with the exception of the federal
government's power as trustee. The tribe had adopted a liquor ordinance
78
under the authority of 18 U.S.C. § 1161. 79 The Indians commenced selling
liquor at two bars on the reservation without a state license. The state later
contended that the tribe was subject to state liquor laws and commenced this
suit. The trial court determined that the tribe had sole jurisdiction over the
sale of liquor on the reservation based on the ordinance and the financial
burdens which would be placed on the tribe by the state licensing require-
ments.
80
The issue raised by the state on appeal was whether the language in 18
U.S.C. § 1161 required complete conformance of the Indians' liquor laws
with those of the state. Relying on United States v. Mazurie,' the Tenth Cir-
cuit stated that Congress had the authority to delegate generally liquor regu-
latory power to an independent governmental unit such as the tribe. In
contrast, if the federal government intended to delegate any of its power to
the states Congress would have to set forth clearly the authority being dele-
gated.8 2 Specific authority to control liquor sales on the reservation was not
granted to New Mexico. The court briefly discussed arguments made by
New Mexico based on legislative history and the twenty-first amendment,
but these arguments were not persuasive. The trial court decision was af-
firmed.
8 3
B. Glover Construction Co. v. Andrus
8 4
In Glover, the Tenth Circuit held that a federal highway construction
contract could not be awarded to an Indian construction company without
76. 590 F.2d 323 (10th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 63 (1979).
77. Id. at 326, 329.
78. 30 C.F.R. 3553 (1978).
79. Indians are allowed to use and sell liquor if the ordinances conform to those of the state
in which the transaction occurs. 18 U.S.C. § 1161 (1976).
80. 590 F.2d at 325-26.
81. 419 U.S. 544 (1975).
82. 590 F.2d at 328.
83. Id at 329.
84. 591 F.2d 554 (10th Cir. 1979), appeal docketed, No. 79-48 (July 10, 1979).
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public advertising for bids.8 5
The facts leading to the litigation were undisputed. The federal govern-
ment, in reliance on a memo issued by the Commissioner of the Bureau of
Indian Affairs, invited only Indian firms to bid on a contract for constructing
a five-mile highway.8 6 No public advertising for bids took place even
though advertising was required under the Federal Property and Adminis-
trative Services Act of 1949 (FPASA).8 7 The district court held that the
contract awarded to the Indian firm was invalid and that the government
would have to advertise publicly for bids on all federal highways. 88
The federal government on appeal contended that the memo's interpre-
tation that only Indian firms were allowed to bid on contracts with the Bu-
reau of Indian Affairs was correct. The interpretation had been based on the
premise that the Buy Indian Act8 9 was an exception "otherwise authorized
by law" under the FPASA; public bidding was therefore unnecessary. In
affirming the trial court, the Tenth Circuit used the following rules of statu-
tory construction: if an express exception is made, other situations are not
saved from the statute's operation;9° construction of a statute must be made
in light of conditions existing at the time of statutory enactment; 9 1 and the
common meaning of the words is to be given to the statutory language.
92
Legislative history also pointed to congressional intent to exclude highway
construction projects from the Buy Indian Act; the purpose of the Act was
rather to purchase Indian "supplies" and "products."
93
In a vigorous dissent, Circuit Judge McKay reasoned that the policy of
the Buy Indian Act was to promote Indian productivity and that the rules of
statutory construction had been applied in a rigid manner not in keeping
with the remedial purpose of the Act. Relying on legislative history, Judge
McKay found "clear purpose" to exempt any Indian products from the
FPASA requirements.9 4
Jo Anna Goddard
85. Id. at 559.
86. The memo interpreted 25 U.S.C. § 47 (1976) (Buy Indian Act) and concluded that, if
available, only Indian companies could bid on any contracts to be awarded by the Bureau of
Indian Affairs. 591 F.2d at 555.
87. 41 U.S.C. §§ 252, 253 (1976).
88. 591 F.2d at 556.
89. 25 U.S.C. § 47 (1976).
90. 591 F.2d at 557.
91. Id at 561.
92. Id.
93. Id at 560-61.
94. Id at 564.
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